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Fundamentalist Federalism: The Lack of a Rational 
Basis in United States v. Morrison1 
Claire L. Huene* 
INTRODUCTION 
The term “federalism” can be defined in various ways, but it 
broadly refers to the theory of the need for, and the purposes served 
by, the separation of powers in the American political system.2 As the 
Supreme Court has often noted, the federal government is one of 
“enumerated powers”; any power not specifically granted to the 
federal government in the Constitution is reserved for the states.3 The 
traditional reason for this division is to prevent concentration of 
power in any one area, and to thereby “ensure the protection of our 
fundamental liberties”4 and “reduce the risk of tyranny.”5 Other 
reasons include preserving the closeness of governmental bodies to 
their constituents, allowing local governments to experiment with 
social policy, and increasing the accountability of elected officials.6 
 
 * J.D., Washington University School of Law, 2002. I would like to dedicate this Note 
to my husband, Christopher Jackson. 
 1. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 2. For a discussion of the meaning of federalism by one of the current justices, see 
Sandra Day O’Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1985) 
(federalism is not “blind deference to ‘States Rights’” but rather “sensitivity to the legitimate 
interests of both State and National governments” (quoting Younger v. Harns, 401 U.S. 37, 44 
(1970)). 
 3. “Every law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers 
enumerated in the Constitution.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607. The Tenth Amendment states “The 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
 4. 529 U.S. at 616 n.7 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanion, 473 U.S. 234, 242 
(1985) (quoting Carcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 572 (1985) (Powell, 
J., dissenting)).  
 5. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 
U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 6. See Susan A. Ehrlich, The Increasing Federalization of Crime, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 825 
(2000). For a full discussion of the history and sources of federalism, see Dennis M. Cariello, 
Note, Federalism for the New Millennium: Accounting for the Values of Federalism, 26 
353 
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In addition to the separation of power between the state and 
federal levels of government, the Constitution also provides for 
separation of power among different branches within the federal 
level.7 Early in its history the Supreme Court asserted its role as the 
branch of government charged with the duty to interpret the 
constitutional limits of federal authority.8 However, the Court’s use 
of federalist doctrine has varied over time, reflecting changes in the 
composition of the Court and in the political, social, and economic 
situation in the country. The Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
depicts this variance most clearly.9 The Court has not only used 
various tests to assess the limit of Congress’ authority under the 
Commerce Clause, but in doing so, the Court has also varied the 
extent to which it will allow Congress to determine for itself whether 
those limits have been reached.10 Federalism therefore encompasses 
questions of the proper balance of power both between the states and 
the federal government, and between the political and judicial 
branches within the federal government.  
The Rehnquist Court has made judicial enforcement of federalist 
limits on congressional authority a priority in virtually all areas of 
constitutional law,11 and has asserted its power in the federal system 
 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1493 (1999). 
 7. The “written Constitution . . . further divided authority at the federal level so that the 
Constitution’s provisions would not be defined solely by the political branches nor the scope of 
Legislative power limited only by public opinion and the legislature’s self-restraint.” 529 U.S. 
at 616 n.7. 
 8. “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the 
law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). In Morrison, the Court 
acknowledged the tension between the political and judicial branches in this regard, but 
reaffirmed that the Supreme Court is the higher authority: “No doubt the political branches have 
a role in interpreting and applying the Constitution, but ever since Marbury this Court has 
remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text.” 529 U.S. at 617 n.7. 
 9. “The Congress shall have Power: To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3. The Court’s “interpretation of 
the Commerce Clause has changed as our Nation has developed.” 529 U.S. at 607. For an 
extreme example of change in Commerce Clause analysis in response to political and economic 
pressure, see infra note 24.  
 10. For an overview of the concept of judicial deference, see Robert A. Chapiro, Judicial 
Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL 
L. REV. 656 (2000). 
 11. See H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for Judicially Enforceable 
Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849 (1999) (providing a historical background for, and an 
examination of, the Court’s modern federalism). For an overview of the areas of law affected by 
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to a great, even excessive, extent.12 In United States v. Morrison,13 
the Court determined that Congress had exceeded both its Commerce 
Clause power and its Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
power14 by enacting the civil rights remedy of the Violence Against 
Women Act of 1994 (VAWA),15 which allowed victims of violent 
crimes motivated by gender to sue their attackers in federal court.16 In 
holding this section of VAWA unconstitutional, the Court was 
willing to override four years of congressional, state and private 
research into the scope of, and proper remedies for, the national 
problem of violence against women in pursuit of its ideal of 
federalism.17  
This Note will argue that the Supreme Court is currently utilizing 
an inherently fundamentalist concept of federalism, which enunciates 
an inflexible rule based on outdated historical precedent, and which is 
not realistically responsive to the needs of modern society. In 
 
the Rehnquist Court’s emphasis on federalism, as well as a strong criticism of its motives, see 
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Court & Justice: An Oxymoron?, 1 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
37 (1999). The Court is “animated by the right-wing political agenda” and has accomplished “a 
revolution in constitutional jurisprudence . . . in the name of federalism.” Id. Other 
commentators have predicted that certain areas of congressional power will not be much 
affected by the Court’s federalism. See Richard E. Levy, Federalism: The Next Generation, 33 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1629 (2000) (predicting that the federal spending power can be an alternate 
basis of authority for federal action).  
 12. These developments have prompted considerable academic commentary. See 
generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate but Equal?: The Supreme Court, The Lower Federal 
Courts, and the Nature of the “Judicial Power,” 80 B.U. L. REV. 967 (2000) (arguing that the 
Court has adopted a more political, legislative role by asserting a strong judicial power, and 
explaining the effect of this development on lower federal courts); Paul D. Carrington, 
Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by Correcting the Excessive Independence of the 
Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV. 397, 401-02 (1999). “[I]t is no longer unreasonable to regard 
the Court less as a court of law . . . and more as a political institution openly and primarily 
engaged in making policy.” Id. 
 13. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 14. “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. “The Congress 
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).  
 16. The statute begins by declaring that “[a]ll persons within the United States shall have 
the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender.” 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b). It then 
provides that a person committing a crime motivated by gender “shall by liable to the party 
injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and 
declaratory relief . . . .” 42 U.S.C. 13981 (c). See infra text accompanying notes 82-97. 
 17. See S. Rep. No. 103-138 (1993); infra text accompanying notes 82-97. 
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Morrison, the Court ignored vital national policy concerns in favor of 
preserving “areas of traditional state regulation”18 without adequately 
analyzing the original functional purposes of the constitutional 
separation of powers. This Note will also argue that the Court could 
have upheld the civil remedy in VAWA under either Congress’s 
Commerce power or its Equal Protection power. The Court could 
have done so if it adopted a more realistic and functional view of 
federalism, not only in terms of the modern need for separation of 
powers between the federal government and the states, but also in 
terms of its own authority to limit the power of the federal 
government. 
Part I of this Note presents the historical background for the 
Court’s Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment analysis in 
Morrison. This background includes the dual issues of the limits on 
federal power and which branch of government should determine 
those limits. Part II presents the legislative history and congressional 
findings of VAWA. Part III analyzes the Court’s reasoning in 
Morrison, and the impact of the Court’s federalism on its decision. 
Part IV concludes by discussing the extent to which federalism is still 
vital to the American system of government, and the conceptual 
changes necessitated by modern reality. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Commerce Clause 
1. Pre-Lopez  
One can briefly summarize the early history of the Commerce 
Clause because the history most relevant to the Court’s holding in 
Morrison began in 1995 with its decision in United States v. Lopez.19 
In the early nineteenth century, the Marshall Court defined the 
Commerce power broadly,20 but later decisions curtailed it. These 
 
 18. 529 U.S. at 615.  
 19. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 20. In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall rejected the argument that the word 
“commerce” should be read literally to mean “traffic” in “commodities”; rather, commerce 
“describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, 
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later cases identified categories of activities which were either non-
commercial by definition, regardless of their economic impact,21 or 
had only an “indirect” effect on interstate commerce and were 
therefore not subject to federal control.22 The rationale for these 
frequently strained formulations was the prediction that without such 
categorical limitations on the definition of interstate commerce, 
Congress would be able to regulate virtually anything pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause and the balance of power between the states and 
the federal government would be lost.23 
In the mid-1930s, the pressing need for federal legislation to ease 
the country’s economic crisis and President Roosevelt’s scheme to 
change the composition of the Court led the Court to abandon both its 
categorical exclusion of certain activities from “commerce” and its 
distinction between “direct” and “indirect” effects on interstate 
commerce.24 In 1937, the Court formulated a simpler test for whether 
 
and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.” 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 
189-90 (1824). The debate about how broad Marshall’s concept of the Commerce Clause really 
was continues in the Court’s Morrison opinion. See 529 U.S. at 616 n.7. 
 21. For example, in United States v. E.C. Knight Co., the Court considered the application 
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 to the manufacture of sugar. The Court held that it could 
not apply the Act to the acquisition of a monopoly in manufacturing, because “manufacturing” 
was not “commerce,” and such application was therefore outside the scope of Congress’s 
enumerated powers. 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895). Similarly, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., the Court 
invalidated the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 by differentiating “mining” from 
commerce, because mining was part of production and commerce could only concern the 
movement of goods which had already been produced. 298 U.S. 238, 303-04 (1936). 
 22. See, e.g., Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding the 
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 unconstitutional; Congress could not regulate the 
hours and wages of employees in a local business because the effect on interstate commerce 
was indirect, and Congress only has power over activities that directly affect interstate 
commerce); Carter, 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
 23. See, e.g., Schechter, 295 U.S. at 548. “If the federal government may determine the 
wages and hours of employees in the internal commerce of a State, because of their relation to 
cost and prices and their indirect effect on interstate commerce,” then “there would be virtually 
no limit to federal power and for all practical purposes we should have a completely centralized 
government.” Id.; Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1, 99 (1937) 
(“stating [a]lmost anything—marriage, birth, death—may in some fashion affect commerce”) 
(McReynolds, J., dissenting). This argument is also the primary rationale the Rehnquist Court 
has given to explain its recent decisions.  
 24. The Court’s decisions in cases such as Schecter and Carter were invalidating 
President Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation. The Court was thus frustrating Congress’ attempts 
to bring the country out of the Great Depression. In response, President Roosevelt introduced 
the “court-packing” plan, designed to add additional justices to the Supreme Court. While 
Congress debated the plan, the Supreme Court abruptly began to uphold New Deal legislation. 
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an activity, even an intrastate activity, could be regulated by 
Congress: if such an activity bore a “substantial relation” to interstate 
commerce, it was within the power of Congress under the Commerce 
Clause.25 Under this new standard, Congress could regulate any 
activity, including intrastate activities, which had either direct or 
indirect effect on interstate commerce.  
With this new, inclusive and flexible definition of the commerce 
power, the Court entered a sixty year period of upholding federal 
Commerce Clause legislation. During this period, the broadest 
construction of the commerce power included, within the 
constitutional scope of federal regulation, any intrastate private 
activity which, in the aggregate, affected the market for goods in 
interstate commerce.26 This “aggregate effects” test exceeded any 
prior conception of Congress’ commerce power, and between 1937 
and 1995, the Court upheld all challenged federal Commerce Clause 
legislation.27 
 
Beginning with the Jones & Laughlin case, Congress abandoned the court-packing scheme and 
the number of Supreme Court Justices remained at nine. This series of events is the origin of the 
phrase “the switch in time that saved the nine.” 
 25. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The 
case concerned the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which prohibited employers from 
engaging in certain labor practices; in particular, it concerned the applicability of the Act to 
employees engaged in “production,” a category specifically excluded from commerce by earlier 
decisions (including Carter, which was decided a year before Jones & Laughlin). The Court 
upheld the law in Jones & Laughlin, stating that “[a]lthough activities may be intrastate in 
character when separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to 
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from 
burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control.” 301 
U.S. at 37. 
 26. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). The case concerned the application of 
federal limits on the amount of wheat grown for market under the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
of 1942, to a farmer growing wheat for his own private use. The Court held that federal limits 
on the amount of wheat grown for market included wheat grown for home consumption, 
because “[h]ome-grown wheat . . . competes with wheat in commerce.” Id. at 128. Moreover, 
the Court held that the fact that the individual’s “own contribution to the demand for wheat may 
be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal legislation where, as 
here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from 
trivial.” Id. at 127-28. 
 27. The one exception to this statement is the National League of Cities case, which the 
Court subsequently explicitly overruled less than ten years later. See infra notes 34-35. The 
Court upheld all other statutes challenged during this period. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a valid exercise 
of the Commerce power); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 
U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 as valid 
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A struggle, however, developed during this period that ultimately 
culminated in the Lopez decision. Initially, the Court simply insisted 
that there were limits to the authority granted to the federal 
government under the Commerce Clause,28 even though the Court 
was consistently finding that Congress had not exceeded those limits. 
In addition, although the Court was giving Congress wide latitude in 
determining whether an activity affected interstate commerce, there 
was increasing judicial scrutiny of the Congressional record for 
Commerce Clause legislation.29 The Court mixed its standard 
“judicial deference” language with a requirement that Congress have 
a “rational basis” for determining that a regulated activity 
substantially affected interstate commerce,30 and that the means 
Congress chose to regulate the activity be “reasonably adapted” to the 
goal of regulating commerce.31 
 
under the Commerce Clause). 
 28. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 30. “The authority of the federal government 
may not be pushed to such an extreme as to destroy the distinction . . . between commerce 
‘among the several States’ and the internal concerns of a State.” Id.  
 29. Although the Court was stating it did not require that “Congress need make 
particularized findings in order to legislate,” it was nonetheless judging the adequacy of those 
findings. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971). In Katzenbach v. McClung, another 
case challenging the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as it applied to a local restaurant whose only 
connection with interstate commerce was that it purchased food sold in interstate commerce, the 
Court noted that although Congress made no formal findings, the congressional record is 
“replete with testimony of the burdens placed on interstate commerce by racial discrimination 
in restaurants.” 379 U.S. 294, 299 (1964). For a discussion of how extensive the judicial 
scrutiny of congressional records has become and its negative effects, see A. Christopher 
Bryant and Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court’s New “On the 
Record” Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328 (2001). 
 30. The “rational basis” standard began in Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 304. The standard 
initially was an expression of the court’s deference to congressional findings. See Hodel, 452 
U.S. at 277 (stating “when Congress has determined that an activity affects interstate 
commerce, the courts need inquire only whether the finding is rational”). Even in Hodel, 
however Justice Rehnquist’s interpretation of the rational basis requirement was more assertive 
of judicial power. In his concurring opinion, he emphasized the importance of this judicial 
scrutiny. 452 U.S. at 311 (“[S]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so.”).  
 31. During this period, the Court often tempered its assertions of the tests, such as the 
“rational basis” and “means/ends” tests, that it could use to limit congressional power with 
more deferential language:  
[T]his is a matter of policy that rests entirely with the Congress not with the courts. 
How obstructions in commerce may be removed—what means are to be employed—is 
within the sound and exclusive discretion of the Congress. It is subject to only one 
caveat—that the means chosen by it must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted 
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Most importantly, concerns about state autonomy began to 
surface. At first, these concerns were limited to dissenting opinions,32 
but in the mid-1970s, after changes in the composition of the Court,33 
a divided Court briefly invalidated a federal statute for exceeding 
Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.34 Less than ten 
years later, however, the Court overturned this ruling, indicating its 
deep division as to the proper limits on Congressional power and the 
proper role of the Court in determining those limits.35 By this time, 
federalism clearly emerged as the battleground for the divided Court 
and the dissenting Justices indicated that they would change the law 
again if they regained a majority.36 Thus, by the time of the Lopez 
decision in 1995, the uniformity of the results in Commerce Clause 
cases, which had upheld virtually all federal legislation for more than 
sixty years, belied the signals of another impending change in the 
Court’s treatment of the Commerce Clause. 
2. The Lopez Decision 
The Lopez case involved a challenge to the Gun-Free School Zone 
Act of 1990, which made possession of a firearm in a school zone a 
 
by the Constitution. 
Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 261-62.  
 32. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 201 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 33. President Nixon appointed Chief Justice Rehnquist to the Supreme Court in 1972. 
 34. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The Court held that the 
minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 could 
not be applied to employees of state and local governments, because employment decisions are 
a traditional government function necessary for “the States’ ‘separate and independent 
existence.’” Id. at 851 (citing Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)). 
 35. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The Court held that 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the same statute which had been held unconstitutional in 
National League of Cities, could be applied to a local government transit authority. 
 36. There were three separate dissenting opinions. Justice Powell stated that although “the 
Court’s opinion purports to recognize that the States retain some sovereign power, it does not 
identify even a single aspect of state authority that would remain when the Commerce Clause is 
invoked to justify federal regulation.” Garcia, 469 U.S. at 579 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice 
O’Connor used even stronger language: “The Court today surveys the battle scene of federalism 
and sounds a retreat.” Id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Rehnquist predicted 
the Court’s return to strict federalism: “I do not think it incumbant on those of us in dissent to 
spell out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again command 
the support of a majority of this Court.” Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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federal criminal offense.37 In finding the statute unconstitutional, the 
Court began with a detailed history of Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, emphasizing that even the broadest prior 
interpretations of the Commerce Clause included some limits on 
Congress’s commerce power.38 The Court noted its duty to enforce 
these limits by applying the “rational basis” test. The Lopez version 
of this test, however, differed from earlier enunciations, in that it 
seemed to indicate the Court should not decide whether Congress had 
a rational basis for concluding that an activity substantially affected39 
interstate commerce, but should instead conduct an independent 
review of congressional findings in order to determine whether a 
rational basis actually existed.40 
After determining that the statute at issue did not directly regulate 
either the “channels” or the “instrumentalities” of interstate 
commerce, the Court discussed whether the statute properly regulated 
an activity “substantially related” to interstate commerce.41 Most 
significantly, the court characterized prior valid Commerce Clause 
legislation as dealing with “economic activities,” and noted that 
 
 37. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1990). 
 38. “But even these modern-era precedents which have expanded congressional power 
under the Commerce Clause confirm that this power is subject to outer limits.” 514 U.S. at 556-
57. 
 39. In previous cases, the Court had been somewhat inconsistent in its use of the 
“substantially affects” test; some cases simply asked whether the activity “affected” interstate 
commerce. The Lopez court noted this inconsistency and settled the matter in favor of the 
“substantially affects” test. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. 
 40. Compare the Court’s statement in Lopez that it must “decide whether a rational basis 
existed for concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce,” 514 
U.S. at 557 (emphasis added), with an earlier statement in Katzenbach v. McClung: “But where 
we find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis 
for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our 
investigation is at an end.” 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (emphasis added). In Lopez, the Court shifted 
from the previous subjective standard articulated in McClung to an objective standard. 
 41. After analyzing the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Lopez Court 
identified three categories of legitimate congressional authority under the Commerce Clause: 
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. . . . 
Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the 
threat may come only from intrastate activities. . . . Finally, Congress’ commerce 
authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to 
interstate commerce. 
514 U.S. at 558-59. 
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possession of a gun in a school zone was not an economic activity.42 
The consequence of this distinction between “economic” and 
“noneconomic” activities was that the Lopez Court formulated new 
factors to determine whether Congress could regulate a non-
economic activity pursuant to its Commerce power. 
In determining that the statute was an unconstitutional regulation 
of a noneconomic activity, the Court noted several factors. The 
statute was not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic 
activity.43 The statute contained no jurisdictional element that would 
require a case-by-case showing of effect on interstate commerce.44 
Finally, in enacting the statute, Congress made no findings that the 
Court could use to evaluate whether the activity substantially affected 
interstate commerce, and no affect was visible “to the naked eye.”45  
The Court was less explicit about the importance of other aspects 
of its analysis. The Court repeatedly noted that the statute was a 
“criminal statute.”46 In addition, while the Court clearly retained the 
“aggregate effects” test from prior Commerce Clause jurisprudence, 
it seemed to apply this test only to economic activities. These are 
important distinctions because they allowed the Court to reject the 
governments primary arguments in support of the constitutionality of 
the statute: the “costs of crime” and “national productivity” 
arguments.47  
 
 42. “The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity 
that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.” 
514 U.S. at 567. 
 43. Id. at 561. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 563. 
 46. “Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 
‘commerce’ . . . .” Id. at 561. 
 47. 514 U.S. at 564. The “costs of crime” argument in this context was that since 
possession of a firearm may result in violent crime, and since violent crime will, in the 
aggregate, substantially affect the nation’s economy by increasing insurance costs and reducing 
the willingness of citizens to travel to parts of the country where crime is a problem, Congress 
should be able to regulate it in order to protect interstate commerce. The “national productivity” 
argument was that interstate commerce depends on the education of the country’s citizens, and 
therefore Congress should be able to regulate crime in school zones. In the Gun Free School 
Zone Act context, these justifications seem very tenuous. However, the Court’s per se rejection 
of these arguments in Lopez led to a similar per se rejection of them in Morrison, although both 
arguments were much stronger in the VAWA context. 
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The Court used federalism to justify its rejection of these 
arguments and its formulation of a new Commerce Clause analysis.48 
The Court stated that if it were to uphold the statute, it would “be 
difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power,”49 even in such 
areas of traditional state sovereignty as education and criminal law 
enforcement.50 
The Lopez decision raised many questions among commentators 
and lower courts. Some commentators predicted the case would be an 
isolated example of judicial activism, a reprimand directed at 
Congress for failing to compile a legislative history. Others warmly 
welcomed the Court’s return to its “duties” in preserving federalist 
limits on congressional power.51 In particular, many commentators 
were speculative about the future of VAWA’s civil rights remedy in 
the wake of Lopez.52 However, for the most part, lower courts were 
reluctant to interpret Lopez too broadly, and they upheld the 
VAWA’s civil remedy.53  
The Fourth Circuit changed this trend when, in 1999, it 
invalidated the VAWA’s civil rights remedy. This holding offered the 
Supreme Court a chance to clarify some of the confusion surrounding 
 
 48. The Court itself, in both Lopez and Morrison, does not acknowledge that it departed 
from prior Commerce Clause decisions. 
 49. 514 U.S. at 564. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense 
of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995) (praising the Court’s “revolutionary” 
return to federalism after having been “‘asleep at the constitutional switch’ for more than fifty 
years” (quoting Expansion Checked, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1995, at A14)).  
 52. See Troy Robert Rackham, Note, Enumerated Limits, Normative Principles, and 
Congressional Overstepping: Why the Civil Rights Provision of the Violence Against Women 
Act is Unconstitutional, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 447 (2000) (predicting that the 
Supreme Court would find the VAWA unconstitutional after Lopez); see also Johanna R. 
Shargel, Note, In Defense of the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, 106 
YALE L.J. 1849 (1997) (arguing that even after Lopez, the VAWA is a valid exercise of 
Congress’ commerce power); Melinda M. Renshaw, Note, Choosing Between Principles of 
Federal Power: The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, 47 EMORY L.J. 
819 (1998). For the opinion of the drafter of the provision, see Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., The 
Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A Defense, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 
(2000). 
 53. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996) (holding that the VAWA is 
constitutional even after Lopez). But see Bergeron v. Bergeron, 48 F. Supp. 2d 628 (M.D. La. 
1999) (finding the VAWA unconstitutional under Lopez and following Brzonkala v. Virginia 
Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999)). 
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the application of Lopez, particularly on the subject of judicial 
scrutiny of legislative findings.54 
B. The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause55 
Unlike the Commerce Clause analysis in Morrison, which was 
almost entirely controlled by a very recent case, the Court’s 
Fourteenth Amendment analysis in Lopez relied primarily on two 
cases from the late nineteenth century, United States v. Harris56 and 
the In re Civil Rights Cases.57 
In Harris, the Court found unconstitutional a section of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871 which made it a federal crime for “two or more 
persons” to deprive any person of the equal protection of the laws or 
of equal privileges under the laws.58 The Court interpreted the 
Fourteenth Amendment to require state action, and since the statute 
applied to private persons without reference to any state law or act by 
any state official, the statute exceeded Congress’ Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection power.59 
 
 54. There was considerable confusion on this issue, as well as the proper scope of judicial 
review, within the lower court decisions leading up to Morrison. For a detailed description of 
the lower courts opinions, see Jil L. Martin, Note, United States v. Morrison: Federalism 
Against the Will of the States, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 243 (2000) (providing an in-depth analysis 
of the different opinions); see also Lawrence G. Sager, A Letter to the Supreme Court 
Regarding the Missing Argument in Brzonkala v. Morrison, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150 (2000) 
(discussing the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Brzonkala, particularly regarding the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 55. For a detailed Fourteenth Amendment history, see Renshaw, supra note 52. For the 
text of the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra note 14. 
 56. 106 U.S. 629 (1882). 
 57. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 58. 106 U.S. 629. 
 59. This reasoning follows from a statutory interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Since section 1 refers only to action by a state and section 5 grants to Congress only the power 
to enforce “the provisions of this article,” it follows that Congress can only pass laws which 
target state action under its Equal Protection power. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5. As the 
Harris Court described it: 
The duty of protecting all its citizens in the enjoyment of an equality of rights was 
originally assumed by the States, and it remains there. The only obligation resting 
upon the United States is to see that the States do not deny the right. This the 
amendment guarantees, and no more. The power of the national government is limited 
to this guaranty. 
106 U.S. at 639. 
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In the Civil Rights cases, the Court considered the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875, which first declared that all persons have a right to equal 
enjoyment of public establishments and further proscribed federal 
penalties for “any person” who denied someone this right.60 The 
Court expanded its justification for the “state action” doctrine61 
expounded in Harris: because this statute also applied to private 
persons without a showing of state action or complicity, the statute 
was not a valid use of Congress’ Equal Protection power.62 
In later cases, the Court broadened the state action doctrine, 
 
 60. 109 U.S. at 9. Note that Congress is now able to proscribe this precise conduct via its 
Commerce Clause power. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 
(1964) (denial of access to public inns and restaurants substantially effect the movement of 
people in the economy). Compare this argument with the Lopez Court’s rejection of the “costs 
of crime” and “national productivity” arguments. See supra text accompanying note 47. For the 
Morrison Court’s similar rejection, despite much greater and more persuasive evidence, see 
infra text accompanying note 104. 
 61. The Civil Rights Court’s definition of “state action” requires some attention. The 
definition includes the sentence: “State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or 
executive proceedings.” 109 U.S. at 17. However, the issue of a state supported “custom” is not 
explored further in the subsequent cases, nor in the Morrison opinion. Yet, the issue of 
“custom” is an intriguing concept within the context of gender bias in state courts and law 
enforcement that are targeted in VAWA.  
 62. The Civil Rights opinion further explains the interaction between the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Tenth Amendment and the need for the state action doctrine as a limit to 
Congress’ Equal Protection power. It is worth recounting in full because of its relevance to the 
statute at issue in Morrison: 
If this legislation is appropriate for enforcing the prohibitions of the amendment, it is 
difficult to see where it is to stop. Why may not Congress with equal show of authority 
enact a code of laws for the enforcement and vindication of all rights of life, liberty, 
and property? . . . . The truth is, that the implication of a power to legislate in this 
manner is based upon the assumption that if the States are forbidden to legislate or act 
in a particular way on a particular subject, and power is conferred upon Congress to 
enforce the prohibition, this gives Congress power to legislate generally upon that 
subject, and not merely power to provide modes of redress against such State 
legislation or action. The assumption is certainly unsound. It is repugnant to the Tenth 
Amendment of the Constitution, which declares that powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively. 
109 U.S. at 14-15. Thus, although the power to deny equal rights under the laws in the 
Fourteenth Amendment is “prohibited by” the Constitution to the States, the Constitution also 
does not grant the federal government the authority to “legislate generally” on the subject of 
rights which should be guaranteed to all persons by both private individuals and the states. 
Federalist concerns are clearly the basis for this rationale: if Congress were allowed to 
guarantee equal protection of the laws to all people, whether the threat be public or private, “it 
is difficult to see” where Congress’ power “is to stop.” 
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particularly in the context of the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s. 
In United States v. Guest,63 a case specifically relied on by Congress 
in asserting its authority to enact the civil rights remedy in VAWA,64 
the Court upheld the criminal provisions in the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.65 The provisions were used by the federal government to 
remedy the failure of certain southern states to convict white citizens 
for crimes committed against blacks. In Guest, private individuals 
were charged with violating the civil rights of black citizens, 
primarily by beating and murdering them.66 Although the statute 
targeted private individuals, without requiring any state action, the 
Court inferred state action from the particular indictment, which 
alleged that the private individuals charged had also harassed black 
citizens by making false reports to state officials, resulting in the false 
arrest of the black citizens by the state.67  
In addition, there was language in Guest which, while maintaining 
the state action requirement of previous Equal Protection cases, 
suggested a broad reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, primarily 
by asserting that “the involvement of the State” need not be 
“exclusive or direct.”68 This language was later interpreted in passing 
 
 63. 383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
 64. S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 55 n.72 (1993). 
 65. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1999). Interestingly, this conspiracy statute was amended in 1996 to 
include greater penalties for a conspiracy involving “aggravated sexual abuse.” Id. Given the 
facts of the Morrison case, see infra note 97, the U.S. government can now bring federal 
criminal charges against perpetrators of similar crimes, but after the Morrison decision, the 
victim cannot sue in federal court. 
 66. Note that this statute provides for federal criminal penalties for acts already 
criminalized by the states. The statute’s purpose was to remedy the state’s failure to prosecute, 
investigate, and obtain convictions (largely due to all-white juries) for these crimes. This 
rationale is similar to that underlying the Equal Protection justification for the civil rights 
remedy in VAWA, in the context of unequal treatment of women in both civil and criminal 
courts. See infra text accompanying notes 82-97. Neither statute requires a showing of state 
action; the basis is an underlying assumption of the failure of the state legal process. 
 67. 383 U.S. at 756. Note that the Supreme Court, rather than focusing its constitutional 
analysis solely on the challenged statute, was willing in this case to examine the particular facts 
of the case. For an argument that the current Court no longer considers itself an appellate court 
in this sense, but rather focuses solely on the political issues of the case presented, see Bhagwat, 
supra note 12.  
 68. 383 U.S. at 765. There was even stronger language in the concurring opinions: 
Section 5 authorizes Congress to make laws that it concludes are reasonably necessary 
to protect a right created by and arising under that Amendment; and Congress is thus   
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in District of Columbia v. Carter,69 another case specifically cited by 
Congress in the VAWA record.70 In Carter, the Court again reiterated 
the state action requirement, but noted that the requirement did not 
prevent Congress from targeting the action of private individuals as a 
way to remedy state action.71 
A final case involving congressional regulation of private action 
under the Equal Protection clause was Griffin v. Breckenridge.72 The 
case involved another section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
provided for a civil cause of action under federal law for a black 
citizen denied equal protection of the laws by any two or more 
persons.73 A unanimous Court upheld the statute. In discussing the 
lack of state action in the case, the Court implied that the federalist 
concerns behind the state action requirement were not present in the 
challenged statute.74 The law was not a “general federal tort law” 
because of the jurisdictional requirement of racial “discriminatory 
 
fully empowered to determine that punishment of private conspiracies interfering with 
the exercise of such a right is necessary to its full protection. 
Id. at 782 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan went on to speak to issues of federalism, 
noting that a stricter reading of the Equal Protection Clause “reduces the legislative power to 
enforce the provisions of the Amendment to that of the judiciary; and it attributes a far too 
limited objective to the Amendment’s sponsors.” Id. at 783. There “now can be no doubt that 
the specific language of [section 5] empowers the Congress to enact laws punishing all 
conspiracies – with or without state action – that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights.” 
Id. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring). 
 69. 409 U.S. 418 (1973). 
 70. S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 55 n.72 (1993). 
 71. “The Fourteenth Amendment itself ‘erects no shield against merely private conduct, 
however discriminatory or wrongful.’” 409 U.S. at 423 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S 1, 
13 (1948)). The Court then qualified this statement: “This is not to say, of course, that Congress 
may not proscribe purely private conduct under [section 5] of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 409 
U.S. at 424 n.8. 
 72. 403 U.S. 88 (1971). This case, cited by Congress in the legislative history in VAWA, 
was not even addressed by the Morrison Court.  
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1998). 
 74. 403 U.S. at 96-97. The Court noted that though the language in the challenged statute 
was similar to that in the Equal Protection Clause, there is “nothing inherent in the [statute] that 
requires the action working the deprivation to come from the State.” Id. at 97 (emphasis added). 
The Court went on to examine the legislative history for evidence of congressional intent to 
include private action within the scope of the statute, which it found. Id. at 102. Thus, the 
Griffin Court apparently saw no contradiction between the Fourteenth Amendment “state 
action” requirement and the power of Congress to legislate generally on equal protection, if it 
clearly intended and was otherwise authorized to do so. Id. 
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animus.”75 However, the Court’s decision ultimately rested on the 
fact that Congress had independent authority to enact the law.76 
Later Equal Protection cases addressed issues of whether 
Congress could validly authorize suits against a state,77 and to what 
extent Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity.78 These 
cases are not directly relevant to the Morrison decision except that 
they demonstrate how the federalist standard of the Rehnquist Court 
impacted its analysis of the Equal Protection Clause. As with the 
Commerce Clause, the Rehnquist Court’s federalism has resulted in 
increased judicial scrutiny of congressional findings in the Fourteenth 
Amendment context. The Court has asserted the importance of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in preserving the balance of power between 
the judicial branch and the legislative branch.79 Under this analysis, 
the Court is obligated to apply both a “factual basis” test and a 
“means-ends” analysis to Congressional findings that a given 
remedial action is appropriate.80 The Court’s current emphasis on the 
sufficiency of congressional findings, and the judiciary’s power to 
make an independent assessment of those findings, is therefore 
applicable to the Equal Protection Clause as well as to the Commerce 
Clause. 
 
 75. Id. at 102. See infra text accompanying notes 82-97 for Congress’ specific inclusion 
and definition of a “gender animus” requirement in the civil rights remedy in VAWA. 
 76. Specifically, under the Commerce Clause and the Thirteenth Amendment. 403 U.S. at 
105-07. The Morrison Court did not even reach the idea of independent authority to enact the 
VAWA provision; it found the absence of state action conclusive. See infra text accompanying 
notes 117-20. 
 77. The Eleventh Amendment provides that federal courts may not have jurisdiction over 
suits against a state by citizens of another state. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. See Fitzpatrick v. 
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against 
the states under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, since the Eleventh Amendment is limited by 
Congress’ power under the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 78. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 could not validly abrogate state sovereign 
immunity because it was not a valid exercise of Congress’ power under the Equal Protection 
Clause).  
 79. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 523-24 (1997). “The design of the Fourteenth 
Amendment has proved significant also in maintaining the traditional separation of powers 
between Congress and the Judiciary.” Id. 
 80. Id. at 528-30. There must be a “proportionality or congruence between the means 
adopted and the legitimate ends to be achieved.” Id. at 532. 
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II. THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT 
The VAWA was first introduced to Congress in 1990.81 In the 
four years between the bill’s initial introduction and its eventual 
passage, Congress undertook a detailed investigation of violence 
against women, and gathered reports from the Justice Department, 
twenty-one states, and various private organizations.82 Additionally, 
it held extensive hearings which included testimony of survivors of 
rape and domestic abuse, federal and state law enforcement officials, 
legal experts, and academics.83 The legislation that emerged from this 
process was a comprehensive attempt to remedy the “epidemic of 
violence against women.”84  
Title III of the VAWA was entitled “Civil Rights,” and provided a 
federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence by 
allowing the victims to sue their attackers in federal courts.85 
Congress based Title III on its power under both the Commerce 
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.86 In support of its authority 
 
 81. S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 29 (1990). 
 82. The statistics that emerged from these studies were staggering: 
Every week, during 1991, more than 2,000 women were raped, and more than 90 
women were murdered–9 out of 10 by men. . . . [Gender-motivated] violence is the 
leading cause of injuries to women ages 15 to 44, more common than automobile 
accidents, muggings and cancer deaths combined. As many as 4 million women a year 
are the victims of domestic violence. Three out of four women will be the victim of a 
violent crime sometime during their life. 
S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 38 (1993).  
 83. S. REP. NO. 103-138 (1993). For a detailed history and analysis of the development of 
the VAWA, see Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The 
Violence Against Women Act’s Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (1996). 
 84. S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 38. The VAWA increased federal criminal penalties for 
repeat offenders, provided for mandatory restitution for victims, changed the Federal Rules of 
Evidence to protect victims of sexual violence, increased federal spending for a variety of 
federal and state programs designed to help victims of gender-related violence and created a 
Justice Department Task Force to continuously evaluate these efforts. Id. at 42-48. 
 85. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). Some commentators argue that this provision was 
inadequate and unworkable, regardless of whether or not it was constitutional. See Daniel G. 
Atkins et al., Striving for Justice with the Violence Against Women Act and Civil Tort Actions, 
14 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 69 (1999); Christopher James Regan, Note, A Whole Lot of Nothing 
Going On: The Civil Rights “Remedy” of the Violence Against Women Act, 75 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 797 (1999). Some of the problems with using the civil remedy have more to do with the 
general difficulty of getting victims of gender-based violence to come forward than with an 
inadequacy of the remedy. 
 
 86. S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 54-55 (1993). 
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under the Commerce Clause, Congress found that gender-based 
violent crime restricts the free movement and participation of women 
in the economy, increases health expenditures, and reduces consumer 
spending.87 In support of its Equal Protection power, Congress found 
that the state remedies offered to women were inadequate to protect 
them from gender-motivated violence, primarily because state 
officers and judges treat these crimes less seriously than other violent 
crimes, and because of a persistent bias against women in state 
juries.88 It compared the civil rights remedy in VAWA to other 
federal civil rights remedies, noting that the Court upheld those prior 
laws on similar grounds.89 
Early on, issues were raised regarding the constitutionality of the 
VAWA’s civil rights remedy. Notably, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
questioned the remedy’s validity while Congress was still developing 
VAWA.90 Congress adjusted Title III before enacting it to 
specifically acknowledge and address these concerns.91 In particular, 
the congressional record emphasized the limiting jurisdictional factor 
of gender-motivated crime, noting that the Court’s decision in Griffin 
allowed federal jurisdiction for analogous causes of action if they 
were predicated on a discriminary purpose.92 Congress also excluded 
certain areas of traditional state concern, such as divorce and child 
custody, from federal jurisdiction altogether, and provided for 
concurrent jurisdiction in state courts of the suits authorized by the 
 
 87. “For example, women often refuse higher paying night jobs in service/retail industries 
because of the fear of attack. Those fears are justified: the No. 1 reason why women die on the 
job is homicide.” Id. at 54 n.70. 
 88. Id. at 41-42. The Report cites the “reluctance on the part of [state] government to 
interfere to protect women” in domestic situations, the frequent failure of state police to arrest 
abusers, the persistence of various states laws proscribing different penalties for assault or rape 
of a spouse, and the failure of state criminal and civil justice systems to provide fair trials for 
victims of rape or domestic abuse. The actual statistics are again astounding: over sixty percent 
of rape cases do not result in arrests, less than half of those arrested for rape are convicted, and 
over one-half of those convicted spend less than a year in prison. Id. at 42. 
 89. “This was precisely the rationale on which the Supreme Court relied in upholding the 
1964 Civil Rights Act with respect to race (and presumably, sex as well).” Id. at 54-55.  
 90. For a detailed examination and criticism of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s role in affecting 
the legislative process, see Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, 
and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269 (2000). 
 91. See Nourse, supra note 83. 
 92. S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 51. This factor is the one which may actually render the 
remedy unworkable for victims of domestic violence. See Atkins, supra note 85. 
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civil remedies provision.93  
Overall, Congress anticipated judicial scrutiny of the legislative 
record for the civil remedy, and therefore detailed its purpose and 
findings, including citing its sources of legal authority.94 It reminded 
the Court, somewhat ironically, of the Court’s “rational basis” 
standard.95 It recognized the “means-ends” test as well, including 
reasons why it believed the means chosen were reasonably adapted to 
the goals of the legislation.96 In the end, however, these congressional 
efforts were wasted, since the Supreme Court asserted its authority to 
completely disregard them, and it did so in the name of federalism. 
III. THE MORRISON DECISION97 
The majority opinion in Morrison includes a recitation of 
traditional federalism, including the historical purposes of the 
separation of powers, such as securing the people’s rights,98 and 
preserving a distinction between “what is truly national and what is 
truly local.”99 Nowhere is there any indication that the Court 
considered whether such purposes would be better served by 
upholding or striking down the civil remedies provision of the 
VAWA. The Court makes no mention of the fact that thirty-eight 
states filed amicus briefs on behalf of the statute’s constitutionality.100 
Throughout the opinion, the concept of federalism is simply one of an 
automatic rule. 
 
 93. S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 50-52. 
 94. “Because many questions have been raised regarding title III, this section provides an 
extensive discussion of the committee’s purpose in creating a civil rights remedy for gender-
motivated violent crimes.” Id. at 48. 
 95. Id. at 54. 
 96. Id. at 55 (concerning the Court’s possible means/ends analysis under the Equal 
Protection Clause: “Title III is ‘appropriate’ legislation [because] . . . it provides a necessary 
remedy to fill the gaps and rectify the biases of existing State laws”). 
 97. Brzonkala, a student at Virginia Tech, was raped by two fellow students. For a 
detailed case history, see Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772 
(1996). Note that the involvement of a state university and the university’s failure to respond to 
Brzonkala’s complaints could have been used to infer “state action” in her particular case. See 
supra text accompanying 66-67. 
 98. 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000). 
 99. Id. at 617-18. 
 100. See Martin, supra note 54. 
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A. The Commerce Clause 
The Court based its Commerce Clause analysis on the factors 
identified in Lopez;101 in so doing, it further restricted both the Lopez 
criteria and the standard of review the Court would use in its 
Commerce Clause analysis. It began by confirming the importance of 
the distinction between “economic” and “noneconomic” activities.102 
The Court found that gender-motivated crime, like possession of a 
firearm in a school zone, was not an economic activity.103 It also 
confirmed that the “aggregate effects” test only applied to economic 
activities,104 and it repeated the Lopez implication that “violent 
crime” cannot be regulated by Congress under this test, regardless of 
the magnitude or national scope of the particular crime.105 It then 
analyzed the VAWA civil remedies provision using the Lopez factors 
for federal regulation of a noneconomic activity. 
The Court characterized the other Lopez factors as: (1) the 
presence or absence of a jurisdictional element, (2) the strength of 
any legislative findings in support of congressional authority, and, 
 
 101. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 102. 529 U.S. at 610 (“a fair reading of Lopez shows that the noneconomic, criminal nature 
of the conduct at issue was central to our decision in that case”). 
 103. Id. at 613 (“Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, 
economic activity.”). 
 104. Id. at 611. Technically, the Court did not “adopt a categorical rule against aggregating 
the effects of any noneconomic activity,” but it noted that in its opinion, the aggregate effects 
test had never previously been applied to noneconomic activity. Id. at 613. What the Court did 
do, however, was categorize the civil remedies provision as a regulation of “crime.” Moreover, 
it rejected the “costs of crime” reasoning in the VAWA context because if such an argument 
were accepted, it “would permit Congress to regulate all violent crime.” Id. While it is 
presumably fair to doubt that the Court would deny itself the power to make a distinction 
between a pattern of crime so pervasive as to have an impact on the national economy, and 
random criminal activity, since the Court did not address the magnitude of the problem 
addressed by VAWA, as compared with that in Lopez, the functional result of its analysis is a 
categorical denial of Congress’ power to regulate noneconomic activity under the commerce 
clause. To a much greater degree than the firearm possession in Lopez, which did not even 
address crime that had already happened, the cost of gender-motivated violence is demonstrable 
on a national scale. The Court had to reject a “cost of crime” argument outright in order to 
ignore the size of the problem addressed in VAWA. The goal of the civil remedy was to 
provide a more effective mechanism for victims to recover damages directly from their 
attackers, which, if utilized, would reduce the burden on the national economy. 
 105. The Court repeatedly refers to the civil remedy as regulating criminal behavior, 
although it is not a criminal statute: Congress may not “regulate noneconomic, violent criminal 
conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.” Id. at 617. 
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most importantly, (3) the degree of connection between the activity 
and a substantial effect on interstate commerce.106 This last factor is 
vital, because it represents a return to the “direct” effects test which 
has historically proven unworkable107 and which, at least in the 
context of noneconomic activities, cannot be aggregated to measure 
their effect on interstate commerce. This development calls into 
question a variety of Congressional legislation that has been in effect 
for decades. 
The Court noted that VAWA’s civil remedy lacked a 
jurisdictional element108 and went on to address the congressional 
findings. The Court then, very simply, rejected the entire 
congressional record by declaring that Congress’ method of 
reasoning was faulty. The Court’s rationale was that it had already 
rejected “cost of crime” and “national productivity” arguments, two 
arguments on which Congress relied, in its Lopez decision.109 The 
words “rational basis” were mentioned nowhere in this very brief 
analysis. 
Thus, the Supreme Court altogether avoided any examination of 
the magnitude of the problem of gender-motivated violence as well as 
any functional analysis of whether the problem would be more easily 
addressed at a national or local level of government. The Court 
avoided these issues by simply declaring that a noneconomic activity 
 
 106. Id. at 611-12. The Court describes the “attenuated” link between gun possession and a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.  
 107. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25. 
 108. Interestingly, the Court observed that other provisions of the VAWA were criminal 
statutes which did have a jurisdictional element, such as 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1), which 
provides federal penalties for anyone crossing a state line to commit domestic abuse against a 
spouse or a partner or anyone who commits domestic abuse “during interstate travel.” 529 U.S. 
at 614 n.5. The Court notes with seeming approval that this provision has been “uniformly 
upheld” by lower courts. Id. It is strange to think that the Court’s concerns over federalism can 
be so easily assuaged and at the same time so staunch when it comes to federal regulation 
lacking this technicality. The impact on interstate commerce of people crossing state lines to 
commit gender-motivated violence, when examined in isolation, must be a very small portion of 
the overall impact on the economy of domestic violence in general. Nonetheless, the Court 
confirms that the line-crossing renders this portion of the problem subject to federal control, but 
the overall, much larger problem of domestic violence must be handled by the states alone. This 
conclusion demonstrates how very literal and categorical the Court’s federalism and Commerce 
Clause analysis is. 
 109. 529 U.S. at 612-13. 
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could never be brought within Congress’ Commerce power solely 
because of the size of its impact on the national economy. The Court 
justified its refusal to examine the actual problem by stating that if it 
accepted the “cost of crime” or “national productivity” arguments, 
Congress would become uncontrollable and would have the power to 
regulate other areas of “traditional state regulation,” including 
“marriage, divorce, and childrearing.”110 
The dissenting opinions in Morrison contested both the Court’s 
Commerce Clause analysis and its level of judicial review, 
particularly the absence of the “rational basis” standard.111 The 
dissent, for the first time in the decision, discussed Congress’s 
findings on the magnitude of the problem of gender-motivated 
violence.112 Additionally, the dissent called into question the 
fundamentalist concept of federalism used by the majority,113 
evaluated the underlying values of federalism,114 and mentioned the 
“practical reality” of expanding federal authority as the country 
becomes more closely intertwined.115 
 
 110. That the Court could at once be so confident in asserting its judicial authority over 
Congress in the name of federalism, and at the same time so insecure about its ability to limit 
Congress in the future, would be very puzzling if the Court’s justifications were taken at face 
value. A more plausible view is that the Morrison decision demonstrates that the Rehnquist 
Court will go to extraordinary lengths in pursuit of its version of federalism. 
 111. 529 U.S. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting): 
The fact of such a substantial effect is not an issue for the courts in the first instance, 
(internal citation omitted) but for the Congress, whose institutional capacity for 
gathering evidence and taking testimony far exceeds ours . . . . The business of the 
courts is to review the congressional assessment, not for soundness but simply for the 
rationality of concluding that a jurisdictional basis exists in fact. 
Id. The dissent went on to conclude that the majority had supplanted rational basis scrutiny with 
a new standard of review, one that depends on “a uniquely judicial competence.” Id. at 638. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 639. “The premise that the enumeration of powers implies that other powers are 
withheld is sound; the conclusion that some particular categories of subject matter are therefore 
presumptively beyond the reach of the commerce power is, however, a non sequitur.” Id. 
The dissent also acknowledged the role of the states in support of the statute. Id. at 653. 
 114. 529 U.S. at 661 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I would also note that Congress, when it 
enacted the statute, followed procedures that help to protect the federalism values at stake.”). 
 115. Id. at 660 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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B. The Equal Protection Clause 
A similarly fundamentalist approach was taken by the Morrison 
majority in its Fourteenth Amendment analysis. The Court applied 
the “state action” rule mechanically and, as it did in its Commerce 
Clause analysis, with little practical analysis of the underlying 
problem. Citing Harris and the Civil Rights cases, the Court 
discerned the “time-honored principle that the Fourteenth 
Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state action.”116 It 
dismissed the language in Guest and Carter as “naked dicta.”117 
Although it acknowledged that the Court in Guest implied state 
action from the facts of the particular case, the Morrison Court did 
not itself consider whether state action could be implied either in the 
particular case before it or from the overall congressional record.118 
The Court did not even address the Griffin decision.119 
In fact, in response to the argument that Congress had specifically 
found gender-based disparate treatment by state authorities, the 
Court, rather than address the congressional findings, concluded that 
even if the findings of state action were accurate, the civil remedy 
provision would still be invalid because the means employed by 
Congress were insufficiently adapted to the desired ends. This 
conclusion was simply another reiteration of the literal state action 
requirement, however, because the Court, in passing judgment on the 
type of remedy offered, went no further than noting that the statute 
was not aimed at a “culpable state official.”120 As with its Commerce 
Clause analysis, the result of the Court’s Equal Protection analysis 
was a categorical denial of a type of federal action: under Morrison in 
 
 116. Id. at 621. 
 117. Id at 624. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Under Griffin, the Court might have considered whether Congress had an independent 
constitutional basis for enacting the civil remedy in VAWA. One alternative basis might have 
been international law. See Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Purposes of the Violence Against 
Women Act and International Law’s Enhancement of Congressional Power, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L 
L. 209 (2000). Another alternative might have been the Nineteenth Amendment. See Sarah B. 
Lawsky, Note, A Nineteenth Amendment Defense of the Violence Against Women Act, 109 
YALE L.J. 783 (2000).  
 120. 529 U.S. at 626. 
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the Equal Protection context, Congress may not target private 
individuals as a method of remedying state action.121 
Again it is only in the dissenting opinions that a functional, 
problem-oriented approach takes place. One dissenting opinion asks a 
simple question: “But why can Congress not provide a remedy 
against private actors?”122 The only answer found in the majority’s 
opinion is “just because.” 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Morrison decision vividly demonstrates that the Rehnquist 
Court practices fundamentalist federalism. It applies federalism as an 
inflexible doctrine without analysis of the specific goals and 
problems involved in the legislation before the Court.123 The Court’s 
refusal to examine the underlying problem of gender-motivated 
violence in its determination to assert absolute limits on federal 
power indicates an unwillingness to address the conditions of modern 
society. Moreover, that the Supreme Court could so readily disregard 
the democratic process inherent in legislative action is itself violative 
of federalist doctrine, the ultimate goal of which was to guarantee the 
people’s right to self-govern.124 
This argument is not to say that the civil rights remedy of the 
VAWA would have worked, or that it was necessarily constitutional 
merely because it emerged from a lengthy legislative process. It is not 
to say that the Court lacks the authority to inquire into congressional 
purposes and findings or to invalidate federal legislation. But in 
doing so, the Court must consider the practical implications of the 
problem before it. The Rehnquist Court’s concept of federalism is 
 
 121. For a discussion of the validity of this per se rule, see Evan H. Caminker, Private 
Remedies for Public Wrongs Under Section 5, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1351 (2000). 
 122. 529 U.S. at 665 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 123. For a discussion of the Court’s failure to analyze the VAWA provision as a civil rights 
statute, see Julie Goldscheid, United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the 
Violence Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of Federalism, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 109 (2000) (author was one attorney arguing in support of VAWA’s 
constitutionality before Supreme Court). 
 124. See Lino A. Graglia, The Revitalization of Democracy Revitalizing Democracy, 24 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 165 (2000) (arguing that the American system can be made more 
democratic by decentralizing policymaking and limiting the policymaking power of judges). 
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fundamentalist not because it is wrong, but because it prevents the 
Court from looking any further into an issue than is necessary to 
apply traditional rules. The values of federalism are not irrelevant to 
modern society, but these values find little expression in the Court’s 
absolutism. 
If a more functional and realistic approach to the values of 
federalism had been applied, the Court could have determined the 
existence of a national problem requiring federal action. Moreover, 
because the means chosen by Congress were limited to providing an 
alternative to state remedies, instead of supplanting state authority, 
the practical threat to state sovereignty was minimal. The statute 
merely provided victims of gender-motivated violence a choice. The 
Court’s use of federalist doctrine to deny citizens an additional option 
for protecting their civil rights is problematic at best. 
The Morrison majority mentioned the idea that federalism 
requires a distinction between problems that are “truly national” or 
“truly local.” The Harris and Civil Rights cases took place within 
twenty years of the Civil War, a time about which it might validly be 
said that almost no problem could have been considered “truly 
national.” The simple fact is that today many more problems are 
“truly national” than in the past.125 Some of these national problems 
may encompass areas that the states used to handle by themselves. 
But this fact alone should not cause the Court to end further analysis 
of the issues involved. 
The fundamentalist approach to federalism exhibited by the 
majority on the Morrison Court is impractical and irrational, and, as 
the dissent in Morrison pointed out, should not “prove to be enduring 
 
 125. Concerning the federalization of crime in particular, there are certain crimes, such as 
rape, which are declared morally and legally wrong by every state in the nation. There can be 
no issue here, as there might be for other crimes, of the states’ freedom to experiment with 
social policy. Yet, a victim in one state might be better protected than another, or a perpetrator 
more leniently penalized, depending on where in the country the crime was committed. Some 
crimes can be labeled national crimes if the people, as a nation, universally proscribe them. 
Were it not for our history of federalism, a nationalized, uniform system for penalizing these 
crimes, which could bring federal resources to bear, might be considered an option. This option, 
of course, goes far beyond any suggestion made so far in this Note, but conceptually it is 
difficult to see why the “people’s rights” are better protected by having criminal penalties and 
procedures vary throughout the nation, at least when the underlying wrong is nationally 
condemned. 
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law.”126 Hopefully, it will be replaced by a more functional view, 
capable of discerning how the interests protected by federalism are 
affected by a particular problem and judging accordingly. 
 
 126. 529 U.S. at 654 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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